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The U.S. commercial paper market, an important 
source of short-term funds for corporations, 
changed in many ways over the past decade. At the 
start of the 1980s, the market was reserved pri-
marily for the largest and most creditworthy U.S. 
companies, and investor holdings of commercial 
paper were distributed about evenly over several 
investor groups. Over the next ten years, the mar-
ket grew to about five times its 1979 size; many 
new issuers and some new dealers arrived on the 
scene; some long-standing issuers all but withdrew 
from the market; holdings of paper became more 
concentrated by investor group; and a new form of 
commercial paper emerged. 
In the 1980s, relatively high rates on long-term 
funds and bank loans and an expanding economy 
fueled a rapid expansion of commercial paper 
issuance. Old-line borrowers were a large part of 
the growth, but in addition, many new issuers— 
including smaller U.S. corporations, foreign corpo-
rations, and foreign financial institutions—were 
attracted to the market. The heavy activity in 
mergers and acquisitions in the second half of the 
decade helped drive up issuance. The development 
of the swaps market also stimulated the issuance 
of commercial paper, as borrowers combined paper 
with swaps to create liabilities in other currencies. 
Asset-backed commercial paper also came into use, 
providing off-balance-sheet financing for trade and 
credit card receivables. Finally, the growth of 
money market mutual funds, coupled with a shift 
in the composition of their investments toward 
commercial paper, made them the largest single 
source of funds to the market. 
As the 1990s unfolded in economic recession, 
the commercial paper market began to exhibit some 
growing pains and took another turn in its evolu-
tion. A series of defaults on commercial paper 
began in 1989, and tighter regulations were 
imposed on money market mutual fund holdings of 
medium-grade paper; these events heightened the 
concern about credit quality—always paramount— 
to the point that investors effectively forced many 
medium-quality issuers to cut back sharply on their 
use of the commercial paper market. Some other 
issuers of long standing, rated just above medium-
grade, also cut back on their use of the market. 
A further change has arisen in the commercial 
paper market in the area of services supplied by 
banks. As a result of financial stress on banks and 
with pressure from the markets and regulators for 
banks to raise capital levels, the banks' costs of 
providing letters of credit and backup liquidity to 
the commercial paper market have increased. The 
efforts of banks to increase profit margins on loans 
are tending to make commercial paper funding 
relatively more attractive. Existing and potential 
commercial paper issuers, however, must minimize 
their use of these now more costly services to keep 
costs down. 
Overall, the U.S. commercial paper market 
remains an important source of short-term funds 
for corporations. New issuers of high credit quality 
will continue to be attracted by the liquidity and 
low cost of funds available in the market. 
SOURCES OF GROWTH IN THE 1980S 
Over the 1980s, commercial paper outstanding 
grew at an average annual compound rate of about 
17 percent (chart 1, table 1). In 1988, the size of the 
commercial paper market even temporarily sur-
passed that of the U.S. Treasury bill market. 
Several market forces fueled the dramatic growth 
of the commercial paper market in the 1980s. First, 
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1. Commercial paper outstanding, 1975-91
1 
1. Seasonally adjusted. Shading indicates periods of recession as defined 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Vertical line 
indicates peak; NBER has not yet determined the trough of the 1990-91 
recession. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
movements in interest rates stimulated the issuance 
of commercial paper early in the decade. Commer-
cial paper consists of short-term, unsecured promis-
sory notes issued mostly by corporations. Maturi-
ties range up to 270 days, with most issues 
maturing within 60 days; thus, nonbank firms seek-
ing short-term funds regard commercial paper as an 
alternative to bank loans. At the outset of the 
1980s, when the Federal Reserve sought reductions 
in the trend rate of money growth to lower the high 
rate of inflation, all interest rates soared, and the 
high longer-term rates favored short-term borrow-
1. Commercial paper outstanding, by type of issuer, 
1979-91 
Billions of dollars at year-end, seasonally adjusted 





Year  Total 
Non-
financial 




1979  112.8  30.7  82.2  17.4  64.8 
1980  124.4  36.9  87.5  19.6  67.9 
1981  165.8  53.8  112.0  30.3  81.7 
1982  166.4  47.4  119.0  34.6  84.4 
1983  187.7  46.2  141.5  44.5  97.0 
1984  237.6  70.6  167.0  56.5  110.5 
1985  298.8  85.0  213.7  78.4  135.3 
1986  331.3  77.7  253.6  101.7  151.9 
1987  359.0  81.9  277.0  102.7  174.3 
1988  458.5  103.8  354.7  159.8  194.9 
1989  525.8  131.3  394.5  183.6  210.9 
1990  561.1  146.2  414.9  215.1  199.8 






1979-89  16.6  15.6  17.0  26.5  12.5 
1989-91  .4  .5  .4  8.1  -6.8 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
2. Spread of the London interbank offered rate over the 
composite rate for thirty-day commercial paper placed 
by dealers, 1975-91
1 
1. The rate for commercial paper is the average of offering rates of several 
leading dealers for industrial firms whose bond rating is AA or the equiva-
lent; the average has been converted to a coupon equivalent to be consistent 
with LIBOR. 
SOURCE. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
ing by all firms. Moreover, the base rate on bank 
loans (the London interbank offered rate) increased 
markedly relative to the commercial paper rate 
(chart 2); the large spread encouraged many firms 
to enter the commercial paper market for the first 
time. By the end of the decade, the amount of 
nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding was 
about 21 percent of outstanding commercial and 
industrial loans at banks, compared with about 
11 percent at the start (table 2). 
Second, in 1983, the economy began an expan-
sion that lasted to the end of the decade. In typi-
cal fashion, the issuance of commercial paper 
expanded with the economy as nonfinancial 
firms—manufacturers, commercial concerns, and 
utilities—financed growing production, new inven-
tories, or new receivables; and as financial firms, 
including banks and finance companies, raised 
funds to finance the growing needs of their 
customers. 
Third, the wave of mergers and acquisitions in 
the latter half of the 1980s also produced new 
issues because firms often temporarily financed the 
transactions with commercial paper before tapping 
more permanent sources of funding. ? 
Fourth, the development of the derivatives mar-
kets, especially for swaps, added to market growth 
in the second half of the decade. The growing 
internationalization of financial markets allowed 
domestic and foreign investment-grade firms to tap 
any market for funds, including the commercial 
Billions of dollars 
Basis points 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
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2. Nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding as a 
proportion of banks' commercial and industrial loans 
outstanding, 1979-91 









Paper as a 
percent of 
loans 
1979  284.8  30.1  10.6 
1980  321.0  37.7  11.7 
1981  360.6  55.2  15.3 
1982  399.0  50.7  12.7 
1983  422.5  47.0  11.1 
1984  484.5  72.4  14.9 
1985  511.3  86.9  17.0 
1986  548.1  81.1  14.8 
1987  575.9  84.4  14.7 
1988  620.3  103.5  16.7 
1989  653.9  134.1  20.5 
1990  659.8  150.5  22.8 
1991  636.7  134.9  21.2 
SOURCES. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
paper market, and then to transform the funds into 
the currency, maturity, or interest rate index of 
choice. 
THE INVESTORS AND THEIR SENSITIVITY 
TO CREDIT RATINGS 
The creation of wealth during the long economic 
expansion made vast sums of investible funds 
available to meet the burgeoning supply of com-
mercial paper. The six-fold increase in the assets of 
money market mutual funds between 1980 and the 
end of 1991 accommodated a significant part of the 
growth in total commercial paper (table 3). By 
year-end 1991, the money market mutual fund 
industry held about one-third of all commercial 
paper outstanding and was the largest single inves-
tor group in the market (table 4). Bank trust compa-
nies, on behalf of individuals, were second in share 
of paper owned.
1 Other important investors in com-
mercial paper in 1991 were nonfinancial corpora-
tions, life insurance companies, and the retirement 
and savings plans for state and local government 
employees. 
1. Flow of Funds Section, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; these data include bankers acceptances. Bank 
trusts are part of the sector in the flow of funds accounts that covers 
households, personal trusts, and nonprofit organizations; bank trust 
departments probably account for most of the commercial paper 
held in the sector. 
3. Commercial paper held by taxable money market 
mutual funds as a share of total fund assets and total 
commercial paper outstanding, 1980-91 



























1980  74.4  25.0  33.6  20.6 
1981  181.9  56.8  31.2  35.3 
1982  206.6  50.3  24.4  31.0 
1983  162.6  46.8  28.8  25.5 
1984  209.7  78.3  37.3  33.8 
1985  207.4  87.6  42.2  29.9 
1986  228.4  94.9  41.5  29.1 
1987  254.5  100.4  39.4  26.9 
1988  272.0  117.0  43.0  25.9 
1989  357.5  178.5  49.9  34.2 
1990  414.8  200.6  48.4  36.0 
1991  448.3  187.6  41.8  35.5 
SOURCES. Investment Company Institute and Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. 
All of these investors regard commercial paper 
as they do other money market instruments, as 
assets that are highly liquid and have highly stable 
market values. The liquidity of commercial paper 
arises, in part, from the vast amount of short-term 
funds invested every day. Moreover, dealers bid 
regularly on paper that they have placed for issuers, 
and direct issuers of paper will often prepay on 
their paper at the request of investors. Investors, 
however, typically hold paper to maturity, largely 
because the maturities of commercial paper are set 
to suit investor requirements. 
Because commercial paper primarily is the debt 
of corporations, default risk is a major concern of 
investors. Accordingly, investors place heavy 
emphasis on the evaluations made by the credit 
rating agencies concerning the financial health of 
firms that issue commercial paper. Virtually all 
commercial paper is rated by at least one of the 
four major credit rating organizations (see box). 
Top-rated paper carries a 1+ or 1, and medium-
grade paper generally carries a 2; a 3 is the lowest 
investment-grade rating. 
The rating agencies grade commercial paper pro-
grams according to the inherent credit quality of 
the issuers. A firm that agencies consider worthy of 
a rating of 3 or better, however, generally receives 
the rating only if it also maintains alternative 
sources of liquidity sufficient to pay off its out-
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4. Distribution of commercial paper and bankers acceptances, by type of investor, selected years, 1980-91 
Billions of dollars except as noted, at year-end, not seasonally adjusted 
Type of investor 
1980  1985  1991 
Type of investor 
Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent 
Money market mutual funds  31.6  19.3  99.1  27.6  191.9  33.9 
Households, trusts, and nonprofit corporations ...  42.6  26.0  122.1  34.1  165.7  29.3 
Nonfinancial corporate business  19.4  11.8  45.3  12.6  53.4  9.4 
State and local government retirement plans 
and savings plans  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  29.4  5.2 
Private pension plans  19.5  11.9  19.9  5.6  28.4  5.0 
Mutual funds  3.8  2.3  4.1  1.1  21.5  3.8 
Life insurance companies  8.3  5.1  20.0  5.6  20.8  3.7 
Commercial banks  15.8  9.6  9.7  2.7  10.6  1.9 
Other
1  22.8  13.9  38.3  10.7  44.2  7.8 
Total  163.8  100  358.5  100  565.9  100 
MEMO 
Commercial paper outstanding  121.6  293.9  528.1 
1. Includes federally sponsored credit agencies, thrift institutions, and 
securities brokers and dealers. 
standing commercial paper and other short-term 
liabilities in full at maturity.
2 Backup liquidity pro-
vides funds if the issuer suddenly finds that it 
cannot roll over maturing paper, but only if the 
issuer otherwise remains creditworthy. Thus, 
backup liquidity does not guarantee investors that 
they will be paid off under all circumstances. The 
2. See, for example, Solomon Samson and Mark Bachmann, 
"Paper Backup Policies Revised," Standard & Poor's CreditWeek, 
September 10, 1990, pp. 23-24; and Jane Maxwell Grant and 
others, Alternative Liquidity for Commercial Paper Issuers, 
Moody's Special Report (Moody's Investors Service, February 
1992). 
SOURCE. Flow of Funds Section, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
rating agencies generally require that backup 
liquidity should equal 100 percent of the size of the 
commercial paper program and of other short-term 
obligations. Top-rated issuers, however, can get by 
with less. 
Backup liquidity may come in several forms, 
but often the issuer sets up lines of credit with 
banks. The rating agencies prefer that bank lines 
be revolving credits with same-day availability of 
funds. With a revolving line, an issuer has a con-
tractual agreement from the banks, in exchange for 
a fee, that the banks will lend up to the stated 
amount of money when needed. Nonetheless, most 
Short-Term Ratings by the Major Credit Rating Agencies
1 
Duff & Phelps  Fitch  Moody's  Standard & 
Category  Credit  Investors  Investors  Poor's 
Rating Co.  Service  Service  Corporation 
Investment grade  Duff 1+  F-1+  A-1+ 
Duff 1  F-l  P-l  A-l 
Duff 1-
Duff 2  F-2  P-2  A-2 
Duff 3  F-3  P-3  A-3 
Noninvestment grade  Duff 4  F-S  NP (Not Prime)  B 
*  HI. ma^M  C 
In default  Duff 5  D  D 
1. The definition of ratings varies by rating agency. 
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contractual backup commitments also contain a 
so-called material-adverse-change (MAC) clause, 
which permits the bank to terminate its commit-
ment if the financial condition of the would-be 
borrower deteriorates sufficiently to jeopardize 
repayment to the lending institution. 
THE CHANGING COMPOSITION 
OF BORROWERS AND OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
A snapshot of issuers at the end of the 1980s would 
have revealed a collection of firms far different 
from those in the market at the beginning of the 
decade. At the end of 1989, about 1,250 corpora-
tions and other entities had paper programs in the 
U.S. commercial paper market (chart 3), about 500 
more than in 1980.
3 Many of the new issuers were 
foreign firms and smaller, less well known U.S. 
firms, whereas the traditional commercial paper 
issuer had been a large, well known U.S. corpora-
tion. Because of the stringent credit preferences of 
investors, however, about 95 percent of paper 
issuers in 1989 were rated 1 or 2, close to the share 
at the start of the decade.
4 
The Increasing Importance 
of Dealer-Placed Paper 
Early in the 1980s, commercial paper sold directly 
to investors by the borrower constituted about 
60 percent of all issuance. Direct issuers of 
paper—most of them traditional issuers—borrow 
in sufficient size and frequency that the costs of 
developing an in-house distribution system are less 
than the costs of placing paper through a dealer. 
For nonbanks, an in-house system may become 
economical when outstanding commercial paper 
3. These data are for commercial paper programs in the U.S. 
market and rated by Moody's Investors Service. 
4. These percentages are for all issues rated by Moody's, includ-
ing Eurocommercial paper and foreign domestic programs (Jerome 
S. Fons and Andrew E. Kimball, Defaults and Orderly Exits of 
Commercial Paper Issuers, 1972-1991, Moody's Special Report, 
Moody's Investors Service, February 1992, p. 16). 
In the 1980s, a number of investors were willing to accept 
noninvestment-grade or unrated paper. Some of this so-called junk 
commercial paper was associated with the merger and acquisition 
boom in the latter half of the 1980s; the outstanding value of such 
paper has probably never exceeded $8 billion. 






—  — 1000 
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1. For programs rated by Moody's Investors Service. 
SOURCE. Moody's Investors Service. 
reaches $500 million or more. Many issuers sur-
pass that level, but only about 110—mostly the 
major finance companies and large banking organi-
zations that also distribute wholesale liabilities such 
as CDs—place their paper directly. Only a few 
nonfinancial firms are direct issuers of paper, and 
they account for a small portion of outstanding 
nonfinancial paper. 
The direct issuers responded to the growing 
credit needs of businesses and consumers alike 
during the economic expansion. The large finance 
companies grew rapidly, particularly after the Tax 
Act of 1981 promoted business use of leasing. 
Unlike banks, these institutions rely largely on the 
public markets to fund their loans. Accordingly, 
their use of bonds and commercial paper grew with 
their assets. Likewise, bank holding companies 
continued to use the commercial paper market to 
support parent company operations and lending by 
nonbank subsidiaries. By the end of the decade, 
outstanding paper placed directly by financial firms 
surpassed $200 billion, more than triple the level at 
the start of the decade. 
The steady increase in paper placed directly, 
however, failed to keep pace with paper issued by 
firms that used dealers to distribute their obliga-
tions. By 1989, dealer-placed paper accounted for 
60 percent of all commercial paper outstanding, up 
sharply from about 40 percent at the start of the 
decade (chart 4). A firm ordinarily requires a dealer 
to place its paper if it lacks the name recognition 
necessary to attract investors or if its funding re-
quirements either are too limited or infrequent to 
warrant building its own distribution system. 
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4. Commercial paper outstanding, directly placed 
and dealer-placed, 1980-91
1 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
1. Seasonally adjusted. Almost all commercial paper issued by nonfinan-
cial firms is dealer-placed; the small amount that is directly placed is 
included in the totals for dealer-placed paper. 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Most dealers are a part of investment banking 
organizations. In actions taken in 1986 and 1987, 
however, the Federal Reserve Board authorized 
certain so-called section 20 subsidiaries of bank 
holding companies to deal in commercial paper to 
a limited extent; by year-end 1991, these subsidi-
aries accounted for about 14 percent of outstanding 
dealer-placed paper.
5 
In an issue of dealer-placed paper, the dealer 
generally purchases the paper from the issuer and 
resells it to investors at a higher price, with the 
price difference constituting the dealer's compensa-
tion for placing the paper. Dealers have extensive 
distribution systems that can accommodate the 
paper of a large number of issuers, and new and 
smaller issuers are thus able to sell their paper at a 
lower cost than if they tried to place it directly. The 
increase in the share of dealer-placed paper out-
standing in the 1980s in part reflected the changed 
composition of issuers: Dealers were required for 
the aggressive marketing required to package and 
sell new issuers and new types of commercial 
paper programs. 
5. Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits these subsidi-
aries from being "engaged principally" in the underwriting of, or 
dealing in, securities that are so proscribed for national banks. The 
Supreme Court has determined that commercial paper is an ineligi-
ble security under the act. The Board has ruled that, to qualify as 
not "engaged principally" in the underwriting of, or dealing in, 
ineligible securities, a subsidiary must limit revenues from such 
activities to 10 percent of its gross revenues. See "Legal Develop-
ments" in the following editions of vol. 73 of the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin: February 1987, pp. 138-54; and June 1987, pp. 473-508; 
and "Announcements," Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 75 (Novem-
ber 1989), p. 751. 
The Growth of Guaranteed Paper 
The share of commercial paper programs that 
were fully (100 percent) enhanced by credit 
guarantees—often bank letters of credit—from 
highly rated third parties grew dramatically in the 
first half of the decade. In fact, programs with such 
credit enhancements accounted for about all the net 
increase in the number of commercial paper issuers 
rated by Moody's over that period.
6 Presumably, 
most of these programs were small because their 
outstandings accounted for less than 10 percent of 
all outstanding paper. 
These guarantees ensure that the commercial 
paper will be paid in full at maturity regardless of 
the financial condition of the issuer itself. Because 
investors in such paper rely on the guarantor, rather 
than the issuer, to make payment in full upon 
maturity of the paper, the paper carries the rating of 
the guarantor. Whereas traditional issuers entered 
the market on the strength of their own credit 
quality (or that of their parent), many of the new 
commercial paper programs of the first half of the 
1980s gained access to the market on the strength 
of guarantees by unrelated entities.
7 
The Growth of Dealer-Placed Financial Paper 
Dealers proved particularly successful in marketing 
new financial programs. In fact, outstandings of 
dealer-placed financial paper, which accounted for 
only 26 percent of total paper issued by financial 
firms in December 1979, overtook outstandings of 
directly placed financial paper in 1990. 
During the mid- to late-1980s, the presence of 
foreign financial institutions in the U.S. market 
grew, and these firms generally required dealer 
assistance to promote their names to U.S. investors 
(table 5). By year-end 1991, these firms had out-
standings in excess of $110 billion, slightly more 
6. Moody's Commercial Paper Record (vol. 5, December 1985), 
and the Statistical Supplement to the December 1980 issue. 
7. A subsidiary of a highly rated firm may obtain ratings close to 
or equal to those of its parent if it has the explicit or implicit 
support of its parent. But these forms of support may not have the 
strength of a credit guarantee. For example, even in an explicit 
support agreement, the parent may pledge only to maintain the 
subsidiary's fixed charge coverage or net worth at some minimum 
level; in contrast, a guarantor promises the holder of the guaranteed 
paper to redeem it at maturity. 
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5. Outstanding dealer-placed commercial paper issued by financial institutions 
Billions of dollars at month-end, not seasonally adjusted 
Date  Total  U.S. 
firms 
Foreign firms 
Date  Total  U.S. 
firms 
Total 
Banks  Other  Date  Total  U.S. 
firms 
Total 
Total  U.S. 
subsidiaries 
Foreign 





January  79.3  47.3  32.0  25.2  9.3  15.9  6.8  3.3  3.5 
December  102.6  56.3  46.3  36.2  15.3  20.9  10.1  3.7  6.4 
December 
1987  115.0  61.9  53.1  41.2  19.3  21.9  11.9  5.1  6.8 
1988  161.5  89.4  72.1  52.0  26.2  25.8  20.1  7.9  12.2 
1989  188.6  99.8  88.8  57.4  31.0  26.4  31.4  11.0  20.4 
1990  221.4  107.2  114.2  62.6  36.3  26.3  51.6  23.1  28.5 
1991  221.1  109.5  111.6  61.0  39.1  21.9  50.6  16.8  33.8 
SOURCE. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
than half of all dealer-placed financial paper. 
Almost all of these programs entered the market 
with a rating of 1 or 1+. Highly rated foreign banks 
(or their U.S. subsidiaries) accounted for 55 percent 
of this paper. 
About half of the paper from foreign financial 
institutions in 1991 was issued by their U.S. subsid-
iaries. Many U.S. money market investors are lim-
ited by statute or bylaws to issues of U.S.-chartered 
corporations. To attract funds from these investors, 
foreign corporations—most often banks—establish 
U.S. funding subsidiaries, which typically channel 
the proceeds to their affiliated branches and agen-
cies in the United States or move them offshore. 
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign nonbank financial insti-
tutions, such as Japanese leasing companies, issue 
commercial paper primarily to finance U.S. lending 
operations. 
The remaining half of commercial paper of 
foreign-related financial institutions was issued by 
entities outside the United States, generally the 
parents themselves, who discovered that they could 
tap the liquidity and low dollar cost of the U.S. 
commercial paper market. If so desired, the issuer 
could swap the proceeds into the home currency or 
other currency of choice. For example, British 
building societies—the primary mortgage lenders 
in the United Kingdom—found the U.S. commer-
cial paper market highly receptive to their paper. 
After obtaining cheap dollar funds, they then often 
swapped into sterling, obtaining an all-in cost of 
funds below the cost of raising funds directly in 
sterling markets. 
Outstanding paper placed by dealers on behalf of 
domestic nonbank financial firms—purely domes-
tic entities—also grew rapidly, to $110 billion at 
year-end 1991. Asset-backed commercial paper 
programs accounted for about 45 percent of out-
standings in this category. About 25 percent of 
nonbank financial paper was placed by dealers on 
behalf of their own investment banking firms. 
Smaller finance companies, bank holding compa-
nies, insurance companies, and other firms too 
small to issue commercial paper directly made up 
the remainder of these companies. 
ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER 
One of the most significant developments in the 
commercial paper market in the 1980s was the 
growth of asset-backed paper, a form of asset secu-
ritization used predominantly to finance credit card 
receivables and trade receivables. Asset-backed 
paper expands the funding options available to 
existing issuers of commercial paper and opens the 
market to a wide range of new firms. Asset-backed 
paper also reduces the use of capital by financial 
intermediaries, an important factor in recent years, 
when the marketplace and regulators have pres-
sured many intermediaries to build capital levels. 
The Structure of an Asset-Backed Program 
The issuer in a typical asset-backed program con-
sists of a business entity called a special-purpose 
vehicle (SPV), established as a going concern. The 
SPV purchases pools of receivables from partici-
pating firms (or lends to these firms with then-
receivables as collateral); the SPV acquires the 
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funds for these transactions by issuing commercial 
paper.
8 In a typical bank-advised program, a bank-
ing organization evaluates the credit quality of 
participants—that is, sellers of receivables—and of 
the pools and may provide other services. 
To obtain the highest possible ratings, a neces-
sity for funding, these programs are designed care-
fully to protect holders of the commercial paper 
issued by the SPVs. First, and perhaps most impor-
tant, an asset-backed program is designed so that 
the SPV is "bankruptcy remote."
9 Such a condition 
is based, in large part, on an agreement by the 
entities that do business with the SPV, other than 
the commercial paper investors themselves, that 
they not file the SPV into bankruptcy for one year 
plus one day after the last paper matures. In addi-
tion, the SPV is owned by a party unaffiliated with 
a participant and the bank advisers (if any), often a 
nonprofit organization or employees of an invest-
ment bank; in the event of the bankruptcy or receiv-
ership of a participating firm or advisory banking 
organization, this arrangement minimizes the like-
lihood that the SPV would be consolidated, to the 
detriment of investors in its commercial paper, into 
the distressed entity. 
Second, the face value of the receivables pur-
chased by the program exceeds the purchase price 
paid for them: The excess over the discount 
required for payment of interest provides an equity 
cushion to commercial paper investors. The amount 
of this over-collateralization depends on the loss 
experience of existing or similar pools of receiv-
ables and usually is set at several multiples of such 
losses. 
Third, investors require a second level of credit 
enhancement, generally in the form of a bank letter 
of credit or insurance company surety bond on 
some fraction of the maximum program size. 
Finally, the rating agencies require liquidity 
backup, as in any commercial paper program.
1
0 
8. Pools of receivables must be of high credit quality either 
through diversification that reduces risk or by virtue of the credit 
quality of each entity in the pool. 
9. For a detailed discussion of the concept of being bankruptcy-
remote, see, for example, Standard & Poor's Corporation, S&P's 
Structured Finance Criteria (New York, 1988), pp. 75-76. 
10. The high rating of an SPV requires a high rating for the 
banks providing such support. See Barbara Kavanaugh, Thomas R. 
Boemio, and Gerald A. Edwards, Jr., "Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper Programs," Federal Reserve Bulletin (vol. 78, February 
1992), pp. 107-16. 
Firms may choose to sell assets to, or borrow 
from, an SPV for several reasons. By selling 
receivables, the firm removes them from its bal-
ance sheet and limits its use of leverage. At the 
same time, the selling firm maintains customer 
relationships by servicing the receivables. In addi-
tion, an asset-backed program can provide a useful 
means of diversifying sources of liquidity. Highly 
rated firms with their own commercial paper pro-
grams nonetheless tap asset-backed programs for 
funds for these reasons. Finally, a firm that is too 
small or rated too low to participate in the commer-
cial paper market directly can sell its receivables to 
an asset-backed program, effectively financing its 
receivables at commercial paper rates (plus its 
share of the cost of operating the program). 
The Development of Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper 
The development of the asset-backed sector of the 
commercial paper market arose from several fac-
tors. U.S. banking organizations saw an opportunity 
to generate fee income from potential participants 
in their programs—many of which were the same 
investment-grade firms that they had lost as loan 
customers to the commercial paper market. These 
banking organizations also became more familiar 
with asset securitization. This familiarity resulted, 
in part, from increased market and regulatory pres-
sure to increase their capital ratios. Asset securiti-
zation, and asset-backed commercial paper in 
particular, permitted banks to channel would-be 
borrowers to funding off of bank balance sheets. 
Another factor was that, as discussed earlier, 
financial markets became increasingly familiar 
with, and thus more willing to accept, programs 
that required structuring, such as those with credit 
guarantees. Dealers saw opportunities to market 
asset-backed programs to companies seeking to 
increase liquidity or to reduce leverage, regardless 
of size or rating. Moreover, they already had 
proved successful in marketing lower-rated firms to 
the commercial paper market via guaranteed pro-
grams and realized that a pool of potential business 
existed in companies that were too small to tap the 
commercial paper market through their own guar-
anteed programs. 
Thus, banking organizations formed bank-
advised asset-backed programs, relying on dealers 
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to market the paper. Most bank-advised programs 
entail the purchase of trade credit and credit card 
receivables from a large number and variety of 
investment-grade corporations. The first such pro-
gram was established in 1983. The advising bank-
ing organization had multiple fee-generating roles: 
Its asset-based lending subsidiary established mini-
mum credit standards for participating firms and 
pools of receivables and determined the appropri-
ate "haircut" (over-collateralization) necessary for 
receivables; the subsidiary also monitored the 
SPV's portfolio of receivables. The advising bank 
itself made commitments to purchase receivables 
from the program at par to ensure payment of 
maturing commercial paper, effectively combining 
100 percent credit enhancement and liquidity 
backup in one facility. 
Nonbank programs have also formed, some tar-
geted at lower-rated firms, which banking organiza-
tions have avoided for the most part in their pro-
grams. A nonbank program typically specializes in 
one type of receivable and, in some cases, in the 
receivables of one firm. Examples of the latter case 
were nonbank programs, each established to pur-
chase the private-label credit card receivables gen-
erated by sales at the department store chains of an 
operator that had a noninvestment-grade credit rat-
ing and that could not tap the paper market directly. 
Several of these department store operators have 
filed for bankruptcy since the creation of the dedi-
cated SPVs, triggering the orderly liquidation of 




The number of asset-backed programs increased 
from three in 1985 to eighty-nine by year-end 
1991, and these programs accounted for virtually 
all the increase in the number of U.S. commer-
cial paper issuers (as rated by Moody's) after 
December 1989 (chart 5). Outstandings doubled in 
1989 and again in 1990, and by year-end 1991, 
asset-backed paper accounted for about 9 percent 
of all outstanding commercial paper. As indicated 
in chart 5, the number of bank-advised programs is 
not much larger than the number of other asset-
11. Some new asset-backed commercial paper programs, each 
dedicated to financing the receivables of a bankrupt operator, have 
emerged from the ashes of the earlier programs. The bankrupt 
operators, in effect, borrow from these SPVs using receivables for 
collateral. Each operator in bankruptcy can thus continue to finance 
receivables at low cost. 
5. Asset-backed commercial paper, bank-advised 
and other, 1985-91 
Numbers 
1. Not seasonally adjusted. 
SOURCES. Asset Sales Reports, American Banker-Bond Buyer News-
letters; Moody's Global Short-Term Market Record, Moody's Investors Ser-
vice; and Short-Term Ratings and Research Guide, Duff and Phelps Credit 
Rating Co. 
backed programs, but the average amount of out-
standing commercial paper in bank-advised pro-
grams is far greater. 
FINANCIAL STRESSES AND MARKET 
RETRENCHMENT IN THE 1990S 
The composition of firms issuing commercial paper 
has continued to change in the 1990s, in large part 
because events fostered a sharp decline in the issu-
ance of medium-grade paper (mostly 2-rated), 
some of which was from the ranks of traditional 
borrowers. The primary engine of growth for the 
commercial paper market in the mid-to-late 1980s, 
the long economic expansion, came to an end with 
the close of the decade. Recession set in during the 
summer of 1990, and the economy since has been 
in an extraordinarily slow recovery. Consumers 
and firms cut bac|L 00;borrowing, investors and 
banks became more wary of extending credit, and 
downgrades became more frequent. In a pattern 
typical of recessions, the interest rate premium 
required by investors to hold medium-grade paper 
A 
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6. Spread of rates for paper rated A-2/P-2 over rates 
for paper rated A-1+/P-1, 1974-91
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1. For this measure, companies rated A-1+/P-1 include only those with a 
rating of AAA/Aaa on their long-term debt. Shading indicates periods of 
recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
Vertical line indicates peak; NBER has not yet determined the trough of the 
1990-91 recession. 
SOURCE. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
rose (chart 6). The slowdown in economic activity 
and the increased risk premium curbed the growth 
of commercial paper; but in addition, defaults of 
several commercial paper issuers and a new SEC 
policy that restricted money market fund invest-
ments in medium-grade paper exacerbated the mar-
ket's normal response to recession. 
Defaults 
Between 1971 and mid-1989, the U.S. commercial 
paper market was free of defaults except for the 




 The absence of defaults has been 
attributed to the fact that most commercial paper 
investors did not purchase paper of low quality and 
to the requirement of rating agencies that an issuer 
maintain adequate backup liquidity. Thus, as the 
credit quality of a highly rated issuer deteriorated, 
investors required increasingly greater compensa-
tion for risk, ultimately refusing to purchase new 
paper at any interest rate that the issuer willingly 
would pay. For the protection of such a firm, of 
investors and of itself, the firm's dealer often would 
12. On August 26, Manville defaulted on its commercial paper 
after filing in bankruptcy court for protection against potential 
liability under litigation regarding asbestos sickness. In Moody's 
rating, all the defaulted paper had a prime rating (P-2) from the 
time it was issued to the day of default. Immediately after the filing, 
Manville's short-term rating dropped to noninvestment grade (Fons 
and Kimball, Defaults and Orderly Exits, pp. 9 and 21). 
advise it to withdraw from the market. As the firm 
relied less on commercial paper, it increasingly 
drew on its backup lines of credit at banks or other 
backup sources of liquidity. Thus, in most cases, an 
issuer with declining credit quality would have 
time to cease issuing commercial paper and to have 
its outstanding paper mature well before a default 
became imminent. Moody's has described this pro-
cess as an "orderly exit."
1
3 
In contrast, the defaults in the U.S. commercial 
paper market at the end of the decade reflected 
some of the structural shifts that occurred in the 
market over the 1980s. An increasing number of 
investors became receptive to low-quality credits 
during the 1980s, including paper considered to be 
noninvestment grade; and banks became more 
likely to resist providing adequate backup liquidity 
to those firms under financial stress and unable to 
roll over their maturing paper.
1
4
 In mid-1989, the 
U.S. commercial paper market was hit with the first 
default (other than Manville's litigation-related 
default in 1982) in eighteen years; two more fol-
lowed that year and four more in 1990. 
The 1989 defaults created some concern among 
investors, primarily for paper rated 3 or below, but 
broad effects on the market for higher-rated paper 
did not materialize until the default of Mortgage & 




cies had rated MRT at 2, or medium-grade, in the 
month before its default; at the time, money market 
mutual funds were allowed to hold medium-grade 
paper without an overall limit, and such funds were 
among the holders of MRT's defaulted paper. Fund 
advisers chose to make up the shortfall rather than 




investors began to demand a larger interest rate 
13. See Douglas J. Lucas and Donald E. Noe, Defaults and 
Orderly Exits of U.S. and European Commercial Paper Issuers, 
1972-1989, Moody's Special Report (Moody's Investors Service, 
November 1989). 
14. Fons and Kimball, Defaults and Orderly Exits, pp. 16-17. 
15. In February 1990, Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., a 
major dealer of junk commercial paper, defaulted on its own paper 
(rated 3 by two agencies until just before the default). With the fall 
of Drexel, the market in junk paper withered; outstandings of 
unrated paper shrank from a high of $5 billion in January 1990 to 
$700 million at the end of 1991. The rest of the commercial paper 
market, however, was little affected by the demise of Drexel. 
16. 55 Federal Register 30239, July 25,1990, p. 30241. Money 
funds also held some of the paper on which Integrated Resources, 
Inc., defaulted in June 1989. At the time of its default, the firm was 
rated 2 by one credit rating agency. 
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premium on the commercial paper of other 
medium-grade credits, presumably because of 
MRT's relatively high rating before default. 
Amendments to SEC Rule 2a-7 
In response to concerns about the effect of the 
commercial paper defaults on the portfolios of 
money market mutual funds, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed in July 
1990 to limit money fund holdings of medium-
grade paper through amendments to its Rule 2a-7, 
which governs the investments of money funds. 
The amendments, approved in February 1991 and 
efective in June 1991, were complex but for the 
most part raised the minimum acceptable credit 
quality of paper with two or more ratings from that 
of a single rating of 2 to at least two ratings of 2. In 
addition, the amendments created two categories of 
such eligible paper: first-tier paper, which generally 
requires at least two ratings of 1; and second-tier 
paper, which generally either has one rating of 1 
and one rating of 2 or two ratings of 2. Second-tier 
paper essentially includes all paper that is generally 
considered medium-grade, such as paper rated A-2 
by Standard & Poor's and P-2 by Moody's. 
In addition, before the amendments, money 
funds could hold unlimited aggregate amounts of 
what became defined as second-tier paper. After 
the amendments, money funds could hold no more 
than 5 percent of their assets in such paper; and 
they could hold no more than 1 percent of their 
assets in the paper of any one second-tier issuer, a 
sharp reduction from earlier limits.
1
7 
THE EFFECTS OF CREDIT CONCERNS 
ON THE MARKET 
In the months after the SEC's July 1990 proposal, 
dealers faced growing investor resistance to 
medium-grade issues, especially for paper matur-
ing past the end of the year. The interest rate 
17. Some of the complications in the amendments concerned 
unrated paper and paper with a rating from only one agency. The 
amendments to Rule 2a-7 and a comparison of them with the 
preceding version of the rule are in 56 Federal Register 8113, 
February 27, 1991. 
premium that medium-grade firms had to pay over 
top-rated firms continued to rise, and many found 
that borrowing at banks was the cheaper funding 
alternative. Dealers encouraged other medium-
grade issuers to test the availability of their backup 
lines at banks. The new risk-based capital guide-
lines for banks would become effective at year-end, 
however, and market participants grew increas-
ingly uncertain about the capacity of banks to 
honor all their loan commitments. As a result, rates 
paid on commercial paper, even by highly rated 
firms, jumped in December. 
December 1990 proved, however, to be the point 
of maximum stress. The financial markets calmed 
somewhat and thereafter were capable of handling 
the funding needs of medium-grade firms. 
Medium-grade issuers successfully tapped bank 
lines of credit or their commercial paper dealers, 
while asset-backed commercial paper absorbed 
some of the needs of these firms and grew rapidly. 
But investors remained wary of medium-grade 
paper. Interest rates on it spiked again both at 
midyear and at year-end 1991 because many inves-
tors did not want to show such holdings on their 
published financial statements. The June 1991 
default of Columbia Gas, a second-tier issuer until 
just before its default, renewed concerns about the 
safety of medium-grade paper. With the persistence 
of concerns about credit quality, many medium-
grade firms that had turned to their banks in 1990 
still found banks cheaper than the commercial 
paper market. 
Overall, these events sharply curtailed the mar-
ket for medium-grade commercial paper. In 1988 
and 1989, money market mutual funds with at least 
some private instruments held, in the aggregate, up 
to 8 percent of their assets in medium-grade paper 
(table 6). Money funds started to cut back on such 
paper in the first half of 1990, presumably in re-
sponse to the defaults that prompted the SEC rule 
change. Just before the SEC's July 1990 proposal, 
however, they still held an estimated $14 billion in 
medium-grade paper. By year-end 1990, these 
holdings had fallen to $6 billion, and by year-end 
1991, six months after the SEC amendments took 
effect, second-tier paper vanished from money fund 
portfolios. Other investors also cut back on their 
investments in such paper: Paper rated P-2 by 
Moody's declined by about half in absolute terms 
from July 1990 to December 1991, far in excess of 
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6. Money fund holdings of second-tier commercial paper 
and the size of the second-tier market, 1988-91 
1. Average portfolio weights for sixty money market mutual funds, as 
developed by the SEC. For 1988 and 1989, the data cover fund holdings of 
paper rated P-2 by Moody's Investors Service; for 1990:H1, the data cover 
fund holdings of paper (i) rated P-2 by Moody's or A-2 by Standard and 
Poor's Corp. and (2) rated not less than P-2 or A-2. 
For 1988:H1 through 1990:H1, dollar levels are the sample portfolio 
weights, as developed by the SEC, multiplied by the total assets of all 
non-government-only taxable money market funds, as reported by the Invest-
ment Company Institute; for December 1990, the data are an SEC staff 
estimate; for 1991, the data are from IBC/Donoghue's Money Fund Report. 
2. Jerome S. Fons and Andrew E. Kimball, Defaults and Orderly Exits of 
Commercial Paper Issuers, 1972-1991, Moody's Special Report (Moody's 
Investors Service, February 1992); and Douglas J. Lucas and Donald E. Noe 
Defaults and Orderly Exits of U.S. and European Commercial Paper Issuers, 
1972-1989, Moody's Special Report (Moody's Investors Service, November 
1989). 
3. Excludes government-only funds. 
* Less than $50 million. 
n.a. Not available. 
the amount held by money funds; and as a share of 
all outstanding paper rated by Moody's, P-2 paper 




These developments—defaults, deteriorating 
credit quality, and the SEC's amendments—also 
contributed to a runoff in directly placed financial 
paper after 1990. Firms on the border between first-
and second-tier by that time faced potentially sharp 
18. These data are for all short-term issuers rated by Moody's, 
including Eurocommercial paper and foreign domestic commercial 
paper. The absolute decline in the level of P-2 paper therefore 
overstates the actual decline of paper outstanding of medium-grade 
issuers in the U.S. market. 
To some extent, the decline in P-2 paper also reflects movements 
of firms among ratings categories. A sample of firms that carried 
P-2 ratings throughout the sample period significantly reduced their 
reliance on commercial paper to fund assets relative to a sample of 
firms rated P-l throughout. See Leland Crabbe and Mitchell A. 
Post, "The Effect of SEC Amendments to Rule 2a-7 on the Com-
mercial Paper Market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 
199 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 
1992). 
7. Outstanding commercial paper issued by U.S. banking 
organizations and directly placed by nonbank financial 
institutions, 1980-91
1 
Billions of dollars 
Directly placed by nonbank financial institutions 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
1. Not seasonally adjusted. Commercial paper issued by U.S. banking 
organizations is almost all directly placed. 
SOURCES. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
declines in their base of investors if they received a 
downgrade to 2. Much of the 1991 decline in 
outstanding financial paper placed directly by non-
banks was due to efforts by first-tier firms to fore-
stall potential further ratings changes and potential 
losses of their investor base (chart 7). 
Credit problems also plagued a number of the 
large bank holding companies. Ratings downgrades 
of U.S. banking organizations picked up in 
response to large loan losses and the need to raise 
capital ratios. Accordingly, outstanding commer-
cial paper of bank holding companies—almost all 
directly issued—started a decline from a peak of 
$52 billion in January 1990 to $43 billion just 




year-end 1991, outstanding paper of bank holding 
companies had fallen to $24 billion, around where 
it has since stabilized. 
THE EFFECT OF RISING COSTS 
OF BANK SERVICES 
With steps taken by regulators to raise bank capital 
standards, the financial stresses placed on banks 
19. Leland Crabbe and Mitchell A. Post, "The Effect of a Rating 
Change on Commercial Paper Outstandings," Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, August 1992. The authors show 
that a downgrade to the short-term rating of a banking organization 
conveys new information about the deteriorating financial condi-
tion of the company. As a result, its outstandings decline signifi-
cantly in the weeks after the downgrade. 
Billions of dollars except as noted, not seasonally adjusted 
Period 
Money fund holdings of 
second-tier paper












1988:H1  12.9  5.6  n.a.  n.a. 
H2  16.2  7.0  n.a.  n.a. 
1989:H1  19.6  7.7  94  14.8 
H2  24.7  8.2  97  14.4 
1990:H1  13.8  4.2  102  14.4 
December ...  6.0  1.3  94  12.7 
1991 June  1.4  .4  n.a.  n.a. 
September ...  .4  .1  n.a.  n.a. 
December ...  *  .0  48  7.7 
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have reduced their ability to provide letters of 
credit and lines of credit to the commercial paper 
market. As the financial health of banks has deteri-
orated, the number of those with the high ratings 
necessary to provide these services has diminished. 
In addition, the new risk-based capital standards 
have raised the capital backing required for busi-
ness loans relative to U.S. Treasury securities and 
off-balance-sheet items such as letters of credit and 
credit lines with original maturities in excess of 
one year. In turn, the increased capital required 
presumably raises the cost of the products for those 
banks with capital ratios at or below the required 
levels. 
Before these constraints emerged, highly rated 
commercial banks competed fiercely to supply 
backup lines and letters of credit. Much of this 
competitive pressure came from Japanese banks, 
and more recently, European banks, attempting to 
gain U.S. market share. As a result of this competi-
tion, the banks probably were less than fully com-
pensated for the risks borne and other costs of 
providing these services. As the number of domes-
tic and foreign banks capable of supplying these 
services in the United States has dwindled, the 
remaining banks have responded to the incentives 
of the new capital guidelines by passing on the 
costs of added capital to users of these services. 
Other financial intermediaries have entered the 
markets for these services as profit margins have 
widened, but the reduced availability and increased 
cost remain factors affecting the commercial paper 
market. 
For example, the current climate rendered uneco-
nomic several of the earlier bank-advised asset-
backed structures. In those programs, the bank 
adviser provided all the credit enhancement and the 
liquidity backup. The enhancement, moreover, 
covered 100 percent of the outstanding paper, 
an excessive amount given the levels of over-
collateralization and previous loss experience. 
When the bank itself was downgraded, the rating 
agencies also earmarked the programs advised by 
the bank for possible downgrades; moreover, the 
excess of credit enhancement became particularly 
costly in terms of the capital backing now required. 
Accordingly, many of these programs were restruc-
tured in 1991. To isolate the problems of one bank 
from the asset-backed program that it advises, 
backup liquidity most often now is provided by a 
number of highly rated banks. Credit enhancement 
now is kept to a necessary minimum, and alterna-
tives to bank guarantees—such as insurance com-
pany surety bonds or cash collateral accounts— 
have been used in newer programs. 
More generally, the increased cost to banks of 
carrying out their business appears to have impor-
tant ramifications for the loan and commercial 
paper markets, at least in the near-term. The 
upward pressure on the cost of bank loans will tend 
to make commercial paper the more attractive 
funding alternative for firms. Because bank letters 
of credit on commercial paper also have become 
more costly, however, potential new entrants of 
low credit quality may have to resort to guarantees 
provided by nonbanks to obtain any cost savings. 
Finally, backup lines of credit provided by banks 
now typically carry maturities of less than one year. 
OUTLOOK FOR THE COMMERCIAL 
PAPER MARKET 
Despite the market's recent setbacks and its some-
what changed operating environment, the investor 
base remains, and the commercial paper market 
continues to be a major source of short-term funds 
for corporations. Among the new issuers that enter 
the market will be highly rated foreign firms 
attracted by the liquidity and low cost of the market 
and other programs carefully structured to obtain 
high ratings at low cost. The market already has 
devised some of these structures: The prototypical 
modern asset-backed program minimizes credit en-
hancement provided by banks; and banking organi-
zations have formed SPVs that simply make loans 
to a limited number of medium-grade firms that the 
banks otherwise would have booked on their own 
balance sheets and that therefore would have 
entailed capital backing. • 
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